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Abstract
We introduce the novel concept of coprivacy or co-operative privacy to make privacy preservation
attractive. A protocol is coprivate if the best option for a player to preserve her privacy is to help
another player in preserving his privacy. Coprivacy makes an individual’s privacy preservation a
goal that rationally interests other individuals: it is a matter of helping oneself by helping someone
else. We formally define coprivacy in terms of Nash equilibria. We then extend the concept to:
i) general coprivacy, where a helping player’s utility (i.e. interest) may include earning functionality
and security in addition to privacy; ii) mixed coprivacy, where mixed strategies and mixed Nash
equilibria are allowed with some restrictions; iii) correlated coprivacy, in which Nash equilibria are
replaced by correlated equilibria. Coprivacy can be applied to any peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol.
We illustrate coprivacy in P2P anonymous keyword search, in content privacy in social networks,
in vehicular network communications and in controlled content distribution and digital oblivion
enforcement.
MSC: 91A26, 91A40, 68P20, 94A60
Keywords: Data privacy, game theory, anonymous keyword search, content privacy in social
networks, vehicular networks, content distribution, digital oblivion.
1. Introduction
The motivation of the coprivacy concept and its incipient theory presented in this paper
is one of double sustainability in the information society:
1. Privacy preservation is essential to make the information society sustainable just
as environment preservation is essential to make the physical world sustainable.
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This idea, which we already introduced in Domingo-Ferrer (2009) and in the
conference paper Domingo-Ferrer (2010) which this article extends, should lead to
clean information and communications technologies (ICT) offering functionality
with minimum invasion of the privacy of individuals. Such an invasion can be
regarded as a virtual pollution as harmful in the long run to the moral welfare of
individuals as physical pollution is to their physical welfare. A parallel of climate
change is an information society with dwindling privacy, where everyone is scared
of using any service at all. Just as people’s views on environment preservation
have changed (they now care about environment, they require and pay for green
products, etc.) and this has forced companies to change to green, the same change
is happening now regarding privacy.
2. Privacy preservation itself should be sustainable, and be achieved as effortlessly
as possible as the result of rational co-operation rather than as an expensive legal
requirement. Indeed, even if privacy was acclaimed as a fundamental right by the
United Nations in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
relying on worldwide legal enforcement of privacy is nowadays quite unrealistic
and is likely to stay so in the next decades. However, unlike law, technology is
global and can enforce privacy worldwide, provided that privacy is achieved as the
result of rational cooperation. This is the objective of the coprivacy concept and
theory presented in this paper.
Two major pollutants of privacy are privacy-unfriendly security and privacy-unaware
functionality. Privacy-unfriendly security refers to the tendency of sacrificing privacy
with the excuse of security. This is partly justified by the global threat of international
terrorism. With that argument, Western states have adopted shock measures on infor-
mation security. Beyond the sheer technological challenge of mass-scale communica-
tions security and analysis, a new, subtler and unaddressed challenge arises: security
must be increased with minimum privacy loss for the citizens. The current trend is
to sacrifice privacy for alleged security: disputably, governments track phone calls, e-
mails and, as seen in the Wikileaks case, social media interactions. In the private sector,
privacy-unfriendly security is also present: more and more often, biometrics is enforced
on customers with the argument of fighting identity theft. Privacy-unaware (let alone
privacy-unfriendly) functionality is illustrated by search engines (Google, Yahoo, etc.),
social networks, Web 2.0 services (e.g. Google Calendar, Streetview, Latitude) and so
on, which concentrate on offering enticing functionality for users while completely dis-
regarding their privacy. At most, privacy vs third parties is mentioned, but not privacy of
the user vs the service provider itself, who becomes a big brother in the purest Orwellian
sense.
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1.1. Contribution and plan of this paper
The environmental analogy above can be pushed further by drawing inspiration on the
three “R” of environment: reducing, reusing and recycling.
Reducing Re-identifiable information must be reduced. This is the idea behind database
anonymization: e.g. k-anonymization (Samarati 2001) by means of microdata
masking methods (e.g., Domingo-Ferrer, Sebe´ and Solanas (2008)) reduces the
informational content of quasi-identifiers. Reduction is also the idea behind ring
and group signatures (Chaum and Van Heyst 2006, Groth 2007), which attempt
to conciliate message authentication with signer privacy by reducing signer iden-
tifiability: the larger the group, the more private is the signer. Just as in the envi-
ronment there are physical limits to the amount of waste reduction, in the privacy
scenario there are functionality and security limits to reduction: completely elimi-
nating quasi-identifiers dramatically reduces the utility of a data set (functionality
problem); deleting the signature in a message suppresses authentication (security
problem). A useful lesson that can be extracted from reduction is privacy gradu-
ality: privacy preservation is not all-or-nothing, it is a continuous magnitude from
no privacy to full privacy preservation.
Reusing The idea of reusing is certainly in the mind of impersonators mounting replay
attacks, but it can also be used by data protectors to gain privacy. Such is the case
of re-sampling techniques for database privacy: an original data set with N records
is re-sampled M times with replacement (where M can be even greater than N)
and the resulting data set with M records is released instead of the original one.
This is the idea behind synthetic data generation via multiple imputation (Rubin
1993). Re-sampling is also the idea of the tabular protection method in (Domingo-
Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (1999). However, as it happened for reduction there are
functionality limitations to data reuse: the more reuse, the less data utility.
Recycling The idea of recycling is probably more intriguing and far less explored than
reducing and reusing. Adapted to the privacy context, recycling can be regarded
as leveraging other people’s efforts to preserve their privacy to preserve one’s own
privacy. The environmental analog would be to share a car with other people: we
leverage the other people’s wish to save fuel to save fuel ourselves. Of course,
whether in the privacy or the environment scenario, there is a functionality toll to
this kind of recycling: one must adjust to the needs of other people. Nonetheless,
we believe that recycling has an enormous potential in privacy preservation, as
it renders privacy an attractive and shared goal, thereby making it easier to
achieve and thus more sustainable. In this spirit, we next introduce a new recycling
concept, called coprivacy, around which this proposal is centered.
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Section 2 gives some background on game theory. Section 3 gives a game-theoretic
definition of coprivacy and some of its generalizations. Section 4 illustrates coprivacy
in the context of peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous keyword search. Section 5 illustrates
correlated coprivacy applied to content disclosure in social networks. Section 6 shows
how general coprivacy applies to vehicular networks. Section 7 sketches how coprivacy
can help enforcing controlled content distribution and digital oblivion. Section 8 sum-
marizes conclusions and open research issues. A preliminary conference version of this
paper appeared in Domingo-Ferrer (2010).
2. Basics of game theory
A game is a protocol between a set of N players, {1, . . . ,N}. Each player i has her own
set of possible strategies, say Si. To play the game, each player i selects a strategy si ∈ Si.
We will use s = (s1, . . . ,sN) to denote the vector of strategies selected by the players and
S = Πi Si to denote the set of all possible ways in which players can pick strategies.
The vector of strategies s ∈ S selected by the players determines the outcome for
each player, which can be a payoff or a cost. In general, the outcome will be different
for different players. To specify the game, we need to give, for each player, a preference
ordering on these outcomes by giving a complete, transitive, reflexive binary relation on
the set of all strategy vectors S. The simplest way to assign preferences is by assigning,
for each player, a value for each outcome representing the payoff of the outcome (a
negative payoff can be used to represent a cost). A function whereby player i assigns a
payoff to each outcome is called a utility function and is denoted by ui : S −→ R.
For a strategy vector s ∈ S, we use si to denote the strategy played by player i and
s−i to denote the (n−1)-dimensional vector of the strategies played by all other players.
With this notation, the utility ui(s) can also be expressed as ui(si, s−i).
A strategy vector s ∈ S is a dominant strategy solution if, for each player i and each
alternate strategy vector s′ ∈ S, it holds that
ui(si, s
′
−i)≥ ui(s
′
i, s
′
−i) (1)
In plain words, a dominant strategy s is the best strategy for each player i, independently
of the strategies played by all other players.
A strategy vector s∈ S is said to be a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951) if, for all players
i and each alternate strategy s′i ∈ Si, it holds that
ui(si, s−i)≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i)
In plain words, no player i can change her chosen strategy from si to s′i and thereby
improve her payoff, assuming that all other players stick to the strategies they have
chosen in s. A Nash equilibrium is self-enforcing in the sense that once the players
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are playing such a solution, it is in every player’s best interest to stick to her strategy.
Clearly, a dominant strategy solution is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the solution
is strictly dominant (i.e. when the inequality in Expression (1) is strict), it is also the
unique Nash equilibrium. See Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos and Vazirani (2007) for
further background on game theory.
3. Coprivacy and its generalizations
We introduce in this section the novel concept of coprivacy in a community of peers,
whereby one peer recycles to her privacy’s benefit the efforts of other peers to maintain
their own privacy. Informally, there is coprivacy when the best option for a peer
to preserve her privacy is to help another peer in preserving his privacy. The great
advantage is that coprivacy makes privacy preservation of each specific individual a goal
that interests other individuals: therefore, privacy preservation becomes more attractive
and hence easier to achieve and more sustainable. A game-theoretic formalization of
coprivacy follows.
Definition 1 (Coprivacy) Let Π be a game with self-interested, rational peer players
P1, . . . ,PN , and an optional system player P0. Each player may have leaked a different
amount of private information to the rest of players before the game starts. The game is
as follows: i) P1 selects one player Pk with k ∈ {0}∪{2, · · · ,N} and submits a request to
Pk; ii) If k = 0, P0 always processes P1’s request; if k > 1, Pk decides whether to process
P1’s request (which may involve accessing the system player on P1’s behalf) or reject
it. The players’ strategies are S0 = {s01} (process P1’s request); S1 = {s10,s12, · · · ,s1N},
where s1j means that P1 selects P j; for i > 1, Si = {si1,si2}, where si1 means processing
P1’s request and si2 rejecting it. Game Π is said to be coprivate with respect to the set
U = (u1, · · · ,uN) of privacy utility functions if, for some k > 1, a peer Pk exists such
that (s1k ,sk1) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium between P1 and Pk, that is, if the best
strategy for P1 is to request help to Pk and the best strategy for Pk is to provide the
requested help.
Note that the notions of privacy utility function and therefore of coprivacy are
based on the aforementioned privacy graduality: one can have a varying degree of
privacy preservation, hence it makes sense to trade it off. In the environmental analogy,
coprivacy is a recycling concept which involves trading off waste reduction among
players. A quantification of coprivacy follows:
Definition 2 (δ-Coprivacy) Given δ ∈ [0,1], the game of Definition 1 is said to be
δ-coprivate with respect to the set U = (u1, · · · ,uN) of privacy utility functions if the
probability of it being coprivate for U is at least δ.
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The following extensions of coprivacy are conceivable:
• General coprivacy can be defined by replacing the set U of privacy utility
functions in Definition 1 with a set U of general utility functions for peer players
Pk combining privacy preservation with security and/or functionality. In general
coprivacy, the interests of peers include, in addition to privacy, functionality and/or
security.
• General δ-coprivacy can be defined by replacing U with U in Definition 2.
• Mixed coprivacy results if one allows mixed strategies for players and replaces the
requirement of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Definition 1 by a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. The good point of mixed coprivacy is that a theorem by Nash
(Nash 1951) guarantees that any game with a finite set of players and a finite
set of strategies has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and is therefore mixedly
coprivate.
• Correlated coprivacy results if one replaces the requirement of pure Nash equi-
librium in Definition 1 by a correlated equilibrium. Indeed, the outcome of inde-
pendent rational behavior by users, provided by Nash equilibria, can be inferior to
a centrally designed outcome. Correlated equilibria resulting from coordination of
strategies may give a higher outcome. We will illustrate this in Section 5 below. In
correlated equilibria, players do not have any incentive to deviate from their cor-
responding equilibrium strategies. An approximation to correlated equilibria are
ǫ-correlated equilibria, in which players have at most an incentive ǫ > 0 to devi-
ate from their corresponding equilibrium strategies. The advantage of ǫ-correlated
equilibria is that they can always be reached by distributed heuristics run by a set
of autonomous players without centrally designed strategies.
• The above extensions can be combined to yield mixed general coprivacy and
correlated general coprivacy. Since mixed coprivacy is always achievable if any
mixed strategy is valid for any player, mixed δ-coprivacy and mixed general
δ-coprivacy only make sense when players have boundary conditions that define
a subset of feasible mixed strategies.
A coprivate protocol is a protocol based on a coprivate game. If a privacy preser-
vation problem can be solved by a coprivate protocol, the advantage is that it is in a
player’s rational privacy interest to help other players to preserve their privacy. We next
give an example to show that the coprivacy concept is latent in existing protocols. More
examples of the potential of coprivacy follow in the next sections.
Example 1 (Coprivacy in anonymous communication) The success of the well-known
system Tor (http://www.torproject.org) for anonymous communication, made even
more famous by Wikileaks, can be explained by coprivacy. As hinted in the Tor website,
“each new user and relay provides additional diversity, enhancing Tor’s ability to
put control over your security and privacy back into your hands”. Therefore, using
Tor is not only good for one’s own privacy, but for other people’s privacy as well.
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4. Coprivacy in P2P anonymous keyword search
Private information retrieval (PIR) is normally modeled as a game between two players:
a user and a database. The user retrieves some item from the database without the latter
learning which item was retrieved. Most PIR protocols are ill-suited to provide PIR from
a search engine or large database, not only because their computational complexity is
linear in the size of the database, but also because they (unrealistically) assume active
cooperation by the database in the PIR protocol.
Pragmatic approaches to guarantee some query privacy have therefore been based
so far on two relaxations of PIR: standalone and peer-to-peer (P2P). In the standalone
approach, a program running locally in the user’s computer either keeps submitting fake
queries to cover the user’s real queries (TrackMeNot, Howe and Nissenbaum 2009))
or masks the real query keywords with additional fake keywords (GooPIR, Domingo-
Ferrer, Solanas and Castella`-Roca 2009)). In the P2P approach, a user gets her queries
submitted by other users in the P2P community; in this way, the database still learns
which item is being retrieved, but it cannot obtain the real query histories of users,
which become diffused among the peer users, thereby achieving anonymous keyword
search. We first proposed a P2P anonymous keyword search system in Domingo-Ferrer,
Bras-Amoro´s, Wu and Manjo´n (2009).
Consider a system with N peers P1 to PN , who are interested in querying a database
DB playing the role of system player P0. If any Pi originates a query for submission to
DB, she can send the query directly to DB or ask some other peer to submit the query
on Pi’s behalf and return the query results.
More formally, the strategies available for a requesting Pi are:
Sii: Pi submits her query directly to DB;
Si j: Pi forwards her query to P j, for some j 6= i, and requests P j to submit the query on
Pi’s behalf.
When receiving Pi’s query, P j has two possible strategies:
T ji: P j submits Pi’s query to DB and returns the answer to Pi;
T j j: P j ignores Pi’s query and does nothing.
Let X i(t) be the set of queries originated by Pi up to time t. Let Y i(t) be the set of
queries submitted to DB by Pi up to time t. For each query xir in X i(t), define F i(xir, t) as
the set of players to whom Pi has forwarded xir for submission up to time t. The players
in F i(xir, t) can be associated relative frequencies as follows: for j = 1 to N with j 6= i,
let f i j(xir, t) be the relative frequency with which Pi has forwarded xir to player P j, up to
time t.
The privacy utility function for Pi should reflect the following intuitions: (i) the
more homogeneous the relative frequencies of queries in Y i(t), the more private stay
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the interests of Pi vs DB; (ii) the more homogeneous the relative frequencies of peers in
F i(xir, t) for every xir ∈ X i(t), the more private stay the interests of Pi vs the other peers.
Given a random variable Z taking values z1,z2, . . . ,zn with probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn,
respectively, Shannon’s entropy (Shannon 1948) is a measure of uncertainty defined as
H(Z) =−
n
∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
The more homogeneous the pi, the higher is H(Z): the rationale is that the outcome of
Z becomes more uncertain as the pi become more homogeneous. The maximum H(Z)
is reached when p1 = · · ·= pn = 1/n.
By assimilating Y i(t) and F i(xir, t) to random variables and relative frequencies to
probabilities, intuition (i) above can be expressed as maximizing H(Y i(t)) and intuition
(ii) as maximizing H(F i(xir, t)) for all xir ∈ X i(t). Hence, those Shannon entropies are
reasonable privacy utility functions for Pi. When Pi generates a query xir at time t +1:
• Pi chooses Sii (direct submission) if H(Y i(t + 1)) ≥ H(Y i(t)), where Y i(t + 1) =
Y i(t)∪{xir};
• Otherwise Pi chooses Sik (forwarding the query to Pk), where
k = arg max
j∈{1,·,N}\{i}
H(F i(xir, t +1)). (2)
In plain words, if direct submission decreases privacy vs DB, the query is forwarded
to the player Pk vs whom the privacy loss is minimum. Note that if Pi forwards her
query to a player P j, Pi always incurs some privacy loss vs P j, because P j knows the
query has been generated by Pi. Therefore, the best policy is to distribute the successive
submissions of a certain query xir as evenly as possible among the various peers. This is
what the choice of k in Expression (2) attempts.
When Pk receives xir, it proceeds as follows:
• Pk chooses T ki (submitting xir) if H(Y k(t + 1)) > H(Y k(t)), where Y k(t + 1) =
Y k(t)∪{xir};
• Otherwise Pk chooses T kk (ignoring xir).
In plain words, Pk submits xir only if doing so increases her privacy vs the DB. If Pk
ignores xir, then Pi will have to look for a second best player to submit xir (and a third
best if the second best ignores xir, and so on). If, after a number of attempts to be decided
by Pi, no peer is found who is willing to help, then Pi must submit xir herself.
If Pi’s best strategy is Sik and Pk best strategy is T ki, then (Sik,T ki) is a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium between Pi and Pk and there is coprivacy between Pi and Pk.
We give a detailed formalization and empirical results for the N-player P2P anonymous
keyword search game in the manuscript Domingo-Ferrer and Gonza´lez-Nicola´s (2011).
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5. Correlated coprivacy in social networks
Social networks (SNs) have become an important web service with a broad range of
applications: collaborative work, collaborative service rating, resource sharing, friend
search, etc. Facebook, MySpace, Xing, etc., are well-known examples. In an SN, a user
publishes and shares information and services.
There are two types of privacy in SNs:
• Content privacy. The information a user publishes clearly affects her privacy.
Recently, a privacy risk score (Liu and Terzi 2009) has been proposed for the user
to evaluate the privacy risk caused by the publication of a certain information. Let
the information attributes published by the users in an SN be labeled from 1 to n.
Then the privacy score risk of user j is
PR( j) =
n
∑
i=1
ℓ
∑
k=1
βik ×V (i, j, k)
where V (i, j, k) is the visibility of user j’s value for attribute i to users which are
at most k links away from j and βik is the sensitivity of attribute i vs those users.
• Relationship privacy. In some SNs, the user can specify how much it trusts other
users, by assigning them a trust level. It is also possible to establish several types
of relationships among users (like “colleague of”, “friend of”, etc.). The trust
level and the relationship type are used to decide whether access is granted to
resources and services being offered (access rule). The availability of information
on relationships (trust level, relationship type) has increased with the advent of the
Semantic Web and raises privacy concerns: knowing who is trusted by whom and
to what extent discloses a lot about the user’s thoughts and feelings. For a list of
related abuses see Barnes (2006). In Domingo-Ferrer, Viejo, Sebe´ and Gonza´lez-
Nicola´s (2008), we described a new protocol offering private relationships in an
SN while allowing resource access through indirect relationships without requiring
a mediating trusted third party.
We focus here on content privacy in SNs. A possible privacy-functionality score for
user j reflecting the utility the user derives from participating in an SN is
PRF( j) = ∑
N
j′=1, j′ 6= j ∑ni=1 ∑ℓk=1βikV (i, j′, k)I( j, j′, k)
1+PR( j)
=
∑Nj′=1, j′ 6= j ∑ni=1 ∑ℓk=1βikV (i, j′, k)I( j, j′, k)
1+∑ni=1 ∑ℓk=1βikV (i, j, k)
where I( j, j′, k) is 1 if j and j′ are k links away from each other, and it is 0 otherwise.
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Note that:
• PRF( j) decreases as the privacy score PR( j) in its denominator increases, that is,
as user j discloses more of her attributes.
• PRF( j) increases as its numerator increases; this numerator adds up the compo-
nents of privacy scores of users j′ 6= j due to those users disclosing attribute values
to j.
The dichotomous version of the above privacy-functionality score, for the case where
an attribute is simply either made public or kept secret, is:
PRF2( j) =
∑Nj′=1, j′ 6= j ∑ni=1βiV (i, j′)
1+PR( j)
=
∑Nj′=1, j′ 6= j ∑ni=1βiV (i, j′)
1+∑ni=1βiV (i, j)
(3)
If we regard PRF( j) as a game-theoretic utility function (Tardos and Vazirani 2007),
the higher PRF( j), the higher the utility for user j.
For instance, take a strategy vector s = (s1, . . . ,sN) formed by the strategies indepen-
dently and selfishly chosen by all users and consider the dichotomous case, that is, let
the utility incurred by user j under strategy s be u j(s) = PRF2( j). It is easy to see (and
it is formally shown in Domingo-Ferrer (2010b) that rational and independent choice of
strategies leads to a Nash equilibrium where no user offers any information on the SN,
which results in an SN collapse. See Example 2 below.
A similar pessimistic result is known for the P2P file sharing game, in which the
system goal is to leverage the upload bandwidth of the downloading peers: the dominant
strategy is for all peers to attempt “free-riding”, that is, to refuse to upload (Babaioff,
Chuang and Feldman 2007), which causes the system to collapse.
Example 2 The simplest version of the above game is one with two users having each
one attribute, which they may decide to keep hidden (a strategy denoted by H, which
implies visibility 0 for the attribute) or publish (a strategy denoted by P, which implies
visibility 1). Assuming a sensitivity β = 1 for that attribute and using u j(s) = PRF2( j),
the user utilities for each possible strategy vector are as follows:
u1(H,H) = 0;u1(H,P) = 1;u1(P,H) = 0;u1(P,P) = 1/2
u2(H,H) = 0;u2(H,P) = 0;u2(P,H) = 1;u1(P,P) = 1/2
This simple game can be expressed in matrix form:
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User 2 H P
User 1 0 0
H
0 1
1 1/2
P
0 1/2
The above matrix corresponds to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Tardos and Vazirani 2007),
perhaps the best-known and best-studied game. Consistently with our argument for the
general case, it turns out that (H,H) is a dominant strategy, because:
u1(H,P) = 1 ≥ u1(P,P) = 1/2;u1(H,H) = 0 ≥ u1(P,H) = 0
u2(P,H) = 1 ≥ u1(P,P) = 1/2;u2(H,H) = 0 ≥ u2(H,P) = 0
The second and fourth equations above guarantee that (H,H) is a Nash equilibrium
(in fact, the only one). The Prisoner’s Dilemma with N > 2 users is known as the
Pollution Game (Tardos and Vazirani 2007) and corresponds to the dichotomous SN
game considered above.
The outcome of independent rational behavior by users, provided by Nash equilibria
and dominant strategies, can be inferior to a centrally designed outcome. This is clearly
seen in Example 2: the strategy (P, P) would give more utility than (H, H) to both users.
However, usually no trusted third-party accepted by all users is available to enforce
correlated strategies; in that situation, the problem is how User 1 (resp. User 2) can
guess whether User 2 (resp. User 1) will choose P.
Using a solution based on cryptographic protocols for bitwise fair exchange of
secrets would be an option, but it seems impractical in current social networks, as it
would require a cryptographic infrastructure, unavailable in most SNs.
A more practical solution to this problem may be based on direct reciprocity (i.e.
tit-for-tat) or reputation, two approaches largely used in the context of P2P file-sharing
systems. We describe in Domingo-Ferrer (2010b) two correlated (actually ǫ-correlated)
equilibrium heuristic protocols based on tit-for-tat and reputation, respectively. They are
intended as “assistants” to the human user of the SN in deciding whether to disclose an
attribute to another user; however, the ultimate decision belongs to the human, who may
quit and renounce to reach the equilibrium.
Those heuristic protocols offer ǫ-correlated general coprivacy, referred to a utility
combining privacy and functionality.
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6. General coprivacy in vehicular networks
Vehicular ad hoc networks permitting car-to-car communication are expected to be
available in cars manufactured in the near future. Several standards for VANET commu-
nication are under way both in the United States (DSRC, Dedicated Short Range Com-
munications, IEEE 802.11p) and Europe (C2C Consortium). We argue that VANETs
must provide functionality, security and privacy and are therefore an application where
general coprivacy can be used:
Functionality. The main raison d’eˆtre of VANETs is to allow vehicles to timely
disseminate announcement messages about current road conditions (e.g. icy road,
traffic jam, etc.) to other vehicles, in order to improve traffic safety and efficiency.
Security. Announcement messages must be trustworthy, because false messages could
seriously disrupt traffic, cause accidents and/or cause certain areas to become
deserted and thus an easy prey for criminals. A posteriori security consists of
punishing vehicles that have been proven to have originated false messages (e.g.
Lin, Sun, Ho and Shen (2007)); hence, means are required to identify malicious
vehicles, for example digital signatures. A priori security is an alternative or a
complement whereby one attempts to prevent the generation of false messages
(e.g. Raya, Aziz and Hubaux (2006)): a message is given credit only if it is has
been endorsed by a number of nearby vehicles greater than a certain threshold.
Privacy. It would not be very fair if the collaboration of a driver to improve traffic safety
and efficiency (functionality) by generating or endorsing announcements forced
her to disclose her identity and location. Note that knowing someone’s mobility
pattern reveals a lot of private information: the driving style leaks information
about an individual’s character (nervous, calm), her whereabouts tell about her
work and social habits, etc. Privacy can be added to a posteriori security by using
pseudonyms or advanced cryptography like group signatures. Adding privacy to a
priori security may imply vulnerability against the Sybil attack, whereby a vehicle
generates a false message and takes advantage of anonymity to compute itself
as many endorsements as required. We have proposed in Daza, Domingo-Ferrer,
Sebe´ and Viejo (2009) a private a priori scheme based on threshold signatures
which is resistant against the Sybil attack and provides irrevocable anonymity to
cars generating or endorsing messages.
Security is a must in VANETs and cannot be traded off. Therefore the general
coprivacy that applies in vehicular networks involves a utility function combining
functionality and privacy. General coprivacy is applicable to VANETs in the following
sense:
• The more privacy players allow to another player, the more announcements
(functionality) they can expect from that player.
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• Conversely, the more announcements players originate, the more privacy for other
announcing players: indeed, the more cars originate an announcement “icy road
near longitude X latitude Y”, the more private the originators stay (this is the
“reusing” principle mentioned above).
7. Controlled content distribution and digital oblivion
In conventional multicast transmission one sender sends the same content to a set of
receivers. This precludes fingerprinting the copy obtained by each receiver (in view of
redistribution control and other applications). A straightforward alternative is for the
sender to separately fingerprint and send in unicast one copy of the content for each
receiver. This approach is not scalable and may implode the sender.
Distributed multicast of fingerprinted content can be modeled as a coprivate protocol.
Indeed, mechanism design can be used to craft a protocol such that content receivers
rationally co-operate in fingerprinting and further spreading the content in a tree-like
fashion. If fingerprinting at each forwarding step is anonymous Pfitzmann and Waidner
1997, Bo, Piyuan and Wenzheng 2007, Domingo-Ferrer 1999), honest receivers will stay
anonymous and free from false accusation, but unlawful redistributors will be traceable.
A related problem is the lack of digital forgetting in the information society. Digital
storage allows perfect and unlimited remembering. However, the right of an individual
to enforce oblivion for pieces of information about her is part of her fundamental right
to privacy. Enforcing expiration dates for content has been championed as a solution
in Mayer-Scho¨nberger (2009), but in a way that depends on trusted storage devices
deleting the content after its expiration date. Alternative hardware approaches based
on employing smart cards on the user side to process encrypted content (Domingo-
Ferrer 1997) could also be envisioned, whereby the smart card would not decrypt the
content after its expiration date. However, such devices do not currently exist; worse
yet, placing trust in the hardware (storage devices, smart cards, etc.) to implement
information protection policies has proven to be a flawed approach: e.g., hardware copy
prevention mechanisms for CDs and DVDs were easily bypassed.
Digital oblivion via expiration date enforcement can be reached through a coprivate
protocol (Domingo-Ferrer 2011). The idea is just to fingerprint expiration dates in the
content. This allows identifying and punishing whoever spreads or uses content past the
expiration date. If fingerprinting is asymmetric and/or anonymous, it will not be possible
to falsely accuse honest content receivers. The problem then reduces to distributed
multicast of asymmetrically/anonymously fingerprinted content, which is approachable
a coprivate protocols, as hinted above. With anonymous fingerprinting, honest players
preserve their privacy. Therefore, the receivers must honestly contribute to the content
source’s privacy preservation (oblivion enforcement by anonymously fingerprinting any
forwarded content with its expiration date) to preserve their own privacy. Hence, the
solution is a coprivate protocol.
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8. Conclusions and research directions
We have introduced in this paper the novel concept of coprivacy, as well as an incipient
generalization theory on it. The main contribution of coprivacy is to make data privacy
an attractive feature, especially in peer-to-peer applications:
• In many situations, players can better preserve their own privacy if they help other
players in preserving theirs. We say that those situations can be handled by so-
called coprivate protocols.
• In other situations, the utility of players consists of a combination of privacy plus
security and/or functionality. If they can increase their own utility by helping
others in increasing theirs, the situation can be handled by a generally coprivate
protocol.
We have sketched the potential of coprivate protocols in very diverse areas: P2P
anonymous keyword search, content disclosure in social networks, communication in
vehicular networks, controlled content distribution and digital oblivion implementation.
Future research directions include developing the theory of coprivacy in the follow-
ing non-exhaustive directions:
• Develop a theory of coprivacy which, given a privacy preservation problem and a
parameter δ ∈ [0,1], can answer under which conditions a δ-coprivate game (i.e.
protocol) that solves the problem exists.
• Elaborate a theory of general coprivacy which also takes security and functionality
into account. In this generalization, the Nash or the correlated equilibrium that
characterizes coprivacy is to be reached by considering utilities which combine
the privacy with the security and/or the functionality obtained by the players.
• Elaborate a theory of mixed coprivacy to characterize when mixed strategies and
therefore mixed coprivacy make sense for utilities about privacy, security and
functionality.
• Create new cryptographic protocols to implement the privacy graduality needed
in coprivacy. Specifically, ad hoc broadcast encryption and anonymous ad hoc
broadcast encryption inspired in Wu, Mu, Susilo, Qin and Domingo-Ferrer (2009),
(n,N)-anonymity signatures and some multiparty computation protocols for social
networks are needed.
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